theoretical question, then, is whether long-term stability is at all dependent on the circumstances that facilitate the consensual establishment of a federation?
The Spanish case suggests that the conditions that lead to a consensus will affect the future dynamics of the federation, thus calling into question MO's assumption that federal bargains of the 'coming' and 'holding' together varieties are equally capable of producing long-term federal stability.
II. The Importance of Federal Origins
Writers on federalism, from Kenneth Wheare (1953) to Thomas Franck (1968) to Alfred
Stepan (2001) to MO (2005) , place considerable emphasis on the circumstances that lead to federation. Therefore, according to these scholars, federalism is a mechanism for bringing together a new state or holding together an existing state if, the appropriate conditions are present.
Wheare identifies two factors that are pre-requisites of federal government. First, the prospective members of the federation must desire to be under a single independent government for some purposes. Second, the desire to retain or establish independent regional governments must coincide with the desire to unite. 5 Wheare acknowledges that these propositions are not useful without an answer to the question: "what are the factors or circumstances which lead communities to desire [federation] and at the same time to desire separation within the union?" 6 The answer to this question, says Wheare, will allow us to assert whether or not federal government will succeed in a given territory.
According to Wheare, the sources of the desire to federate are as follows: a sense of military insecurity; a hope of future economic advantage; a desire to be independent of foreign powers; and some prior political association. This list is not exhaustive or exclusive, as any one or combination can produce the desire to unite. Telling for those interested in the use of federalism to unite different nationalities, is the omission of a common language, race or religion from Wheare's list. In fact, he argues that divergence of nationality and previous existence as distinct governmental units are the main factors that produce the desire for the federating communities to remain separate within the union.
Thomas Franck, another scholar who emphasizes the importance of federal origins, divides the factors and goals that bring about federal structures into three categories. 7 Tertiary goal-factors are to prevent war between disparate ethnic groups or socioeconomic classes, and thus, not to harness any genuine common interests in union. Secondary goal-factors are parallel interests between groups, such as a common language, culture, colonial heritage, challenges, and enemies, which make federation appealing. Primary-goal factors elevate the intrinsic value of federalism above all other political values. Drawing upon evidence from four multiethnic federations that "failed"-the Federation of Malaya, West Indies Federation, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the East African Federation-Franck presents some tentative conclusions: 1) Tertiary goal-factors contain the seeds of their own defeat because conflicting groups will inevitably try to dominate the federation or use its autonomous institutions to separate 2) Secondary goal-factors, while helpful to the federal cause, do not guarantee against failure 3) The absence of primary-goal factors make success improbable. 8 In short, the "one consistent factor" in the failed federations is the "absence of a commitment to the primary goal of federation as an end in itself." The main contribution of Wheare and Franck, therefore, is to illuminate the importance of circumstances surrounding the origins of federations on the prospects of long-term success.
Considering that much of the literature concerning the utility of federalism as a means to regulate ethnic conflict focuses on institutional design, a resurrection of this approach might yield some important theoretical insights.
Alfred Stepan concurs with Wheare and Franck that origins are important to federal success, but argues that a distinction-not made by these authors-between federations whose initial purpose is to "come together" versus those whose purpose is to "hold together" is necessary. 10 In Wheare's ideal schema, a group of individual polities, all of which have strong identities, perceive benefits in pooling their sovereignty and thus "come together" in a federation. Some of the most prominent multinational federations in the world, however, emerged from a different set of circumstances. Spain, Belgium and India were once political systems with strong unitary features, but political elites in each decided that the only way to prevent disintegration was a constitutional devolution of power to subnational units. Therefore, a supplement to Wheare's ideal path to federation, which Stepan calls a "coming together" federation, is a "holding together" federation.
Wheare's proposition does not exclude the possibility of a stable authoritarian federation if it comes together because of a desire amongst the units to come together and remain separate. [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] , therefore, acted as stimulus for nationalist mobilization in these regions. The left-wing parties responsible for the installation of the Second Republic negotiated with the various nationalist movements to make a significant contribution to the maintenance of Spain's unity. 14 Despite the best efforts of these various groups, however, federalism was unstable and short-lived, because the negotiations excluded significant political groups, and so was partly imposed, rather than agreed to.
Shortly after the proclamation of the Second Republic, the Catalan nationalists began negotiations with the provisional Republican government to establish a Statute of Autonomy.
The two sides quickly came to an agreement to reestablish the Generalitat of Catalonia with exclusive power in designated policy areas because the nationalists were moderate on most 14 I use the term nationalist in this paper to refer to sub-state nationalists. 
IV. The 1978 Constitution: 'Holding Together' Federalism
The Francoist attempt to restrain all forms of regional culture through centralization and repression backfired. By the time of Franco's death in 1975, the commitment to a decentralized and pluralist Spain amongst the parties of the left and nationalists was stronger than ever.
Moreover, Franco's failure to produce political stability and sustained economic growth convinced the main parties on the right to accept the dismantling of the centralist apparatus.
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Reaching a political compromise to appease the left, right and nationalists did not prove to be
easy. An exquisitely ambiguous quasi-federal Constitution, however, ensured that no party or group felt it was unacceptable.
Soon after the democratic election of 1977, a 36-member Constitutional Affairs
Commission was set up with the specific task of drafting the Constitution. to ensure that other regions in Spain did not receive the same powers as the "historic nationalities." The position of the PNV and CDC's was that symmetrical federalism-while providing the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia with more autonomy-would undermine the status of the "historic nationalities" as culturally distinct from the rest of Spain (and each other). The socialists and communists were also in favour of autonomous governments for the "historic nationalities," but as a part of a general formula of federation for the entire country. In short, the parties of the left desired symmetrical federalism.
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Resolving this impasse required that each side compromise on its original position.
Article 2 of the Constitution stresses the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation," but also "recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions" of Spain. The distribution of competencies-another issue of contention-pitted the nationalists against the left. The former suggested that the constitution set out separate subjects and fields over which the state, "historic nationalities," and other regions have exclusive jurisdiction. The latter did not want to differentiate the powers of the "historic nationalities" from the other regions in an explicit fashion. In an effort to accommodate both sides, the constitution lists those subjects and fields over which the state has exclusive jurisdiction (Article 149), and those which regions are "entitled to assume exclusive jurisdiction." 27 The nationalists took solace in the lack of precision in the initial level of powers to be adopted by each AC because of the informal indication that the "historic nationalities" would end up with a "high level" of competencies via of decentralization initially received, thus encouraging a "catching up" process among the nonhistoric regions.
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The PNV, however, was not satisfied by the draft Constitution produced by the Committee. The Basques refused to accept any formula that did not explicitly mention the restoration of the fueros (Basque local rights), which had been abrogated over 100 years before.
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As a result, the Basque Country was the only region of Spain that did not legitimate the Constitution in the popular referendum held in December 1978. 31 The formulation of the Basque autonomy statute convinced the PNV to soften their position on the Constitution, because it includes aspects of the fueros, most notably the right to collect taxes and transfer a proportion of them to the central government.
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In a country that maintains a highly centralized tax system, this right provides the Basque Country with greater control over its resources and expenditures than the other AC's. The PNV encouraged Basques to approve the autonomy statute, and over 90% did so in the referendum held in late 1979. 33 In short, the specifics of the autonomy statute were sufficient to bring the Basque nationalists into a consensus with the other major parties of Spain regarding the constitutional formulation of federal institutions.
It is important to acknowledge that the "bunker," consisting of the army and the old In August 1983, the Constitutional Court ruled certain aspects of the law to be ultra vires, but upheld many principles of homogeneity between AC's. For example, the term of regional legislators is limited and each region must accept a specified number of transfers from the national civil service. 39 Despite the overturning of critical portions of the LOAPA, the principles that remain in effect contributed to a more symmetrical process of building regional governments.
Beginning in the early 1980's, the non-historic AC's embarked on a process of 'boundary building', which included the invention of symbols, as well as the rediscovery of local culture, encouraged by the very creation of regional governments. 41 The fact that the Basque Country and Catalonia have jurisdiction in some of these fields was definitely a motivating factor. This culminated in an another agreement, the Pacto Autónomico of 1992, between the PSOE and Conservatives (PP) to increase the powers of the non-historic AC's by amending their statutes within three months, triggering an addition of competencies. 42 Implicit in this expansion was the pursuit of a more symmetrical model of federalism.
The shift towards harmonization resulted in opposition from the nationalist parties. Prior to 1994, the PNV, Convergencia i Unió (CiU), and Galician Nationalist Block (BNG) carefully tempered demands for self-government with allegiance to the 1978 Constitution and participation in national politics. 43 The threat of symmetry, however, pushed the three parties to adopt a common platform of constitutional reform to associate the "historic nationalities" with the Spanish polity in a confederal arrangement. The core demand of a set of six principles for constitutional reform is the explicit acknowledgement of the plurinational character of the Spain, with the only subjects of sovereignty to be the three "historic nationalities" and Castile. The remaining five principles ensure that the "historic nationalities" maintain a substantially higher degree of self-government than the non-historic AC's. 44 The PP rejects constitutional reform 41 Policy fields that appear under state and AC jurisdiction in the Constitution include education, health, and environment. See Garutz Jauregui, "Spain: Political Autonomy and Ethnic Accommodation." In Crawford Young (ed.), The Accommodation of Cultural Diversity: Case Studies, (New York, NY: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999), pp. 162-164. 42 Beramendi and Máiz, "Spain," p. 141. 43 The CDC is part of the CiU coalition that is currently the primary representative of Catalan nationalism. 44 For the remaining five principles agreed upon as a set of minimum standards for constitutional reform, see Beramendi and Máiz, "Spain, " p. 140. altogether, while the PSOE argues that "solidarity," not asymmetry, should guide a general reform of federalism in Spain.
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The conflict between the nationalists and the mainstream political parties intensified after this initial disagreement over constitutional reform. In late 2004, the PNV coalesced with the radical Herri Batasuna (HB) to pass the controversial Ibarretxe Plan (IP) in Basque Parliament.
The plan "intends to enhance the political authority of the Basque Country almost to the point of granting it the status of a country within a country," by situating the region outside the AC framework, albeit still "associated" with the Crown, and opens the possibility of secession, by means of a referendum. 46 Not surprisingly, the Cortes rejected the IP on the basis that it contradicts Article 2 of the Constitution. Moreover, the PP and PSOE jointly voted to ban the HB from political participation because of its supposed link to the violent separatist group, Euskadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA), but with an obvious underlying motive of reducing support for the IP in Basque Parliament. 47 This move backfired, however, as the PNV was able coalesce with the Basque Communist Party, and garner even more popular support for the IP within the Basque Country, which now exceeds 60%.
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In October 2005, the Generalitat passed a regional statute to recognize Catalonia as a "nation," empower the Catalonian high court as the highest judicial authority within the region, and provide Catalonia with the power to raise all regional taxes and control subsequent revenues. 49 The opposition PP argues that the statute is unconstitutional like the IP, while the minority PSOE government takes a softer stance, claiming it is unacceptable in its present form.
45 Beramendi and Máiz, "Spain, Violeta R. Almendral, "Basque Proposal of 'Free Association' Challenges Spanish Federalism," Forum of Federations, vol. 4, no. 4 (2005) It is important here to emphasize that 'coming' together federations emerge from very different circumstances than those of the 'holding' together variety. In the latter, the subunits that federate have much less prior sovereignty, and thus less bargaining power to enter the agreement on their own terms. Furthermore, the fear of a worse alternative (i.e. authoritarian rule or civil war)
forces the different sides to agree to disagree, and introduce ambiguities into the federal bargain.
This can be decisive for future system stability because the different sides may (and are likely to) use those ambiguities as means to pursue their particular goals. For national minorities, this will mean a continued pursuit of more asymmetrical powers, confederation, and even independence.
On the other hand, the central state will press to maintain symmetrical federalism because of the legitimate concerns that more autonomy for national minorities is merely the first step toward eventual secession. In addition, granting special autonomy to one or more regions within a federation would imply their segregation from the rest of the population.
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The Spanish case is exemplary of this dynamic because the adverse conditions under which the parties came to agreement resulted in ambiguities that engendered future conflict.
Another example is the case of India, in which elite bargaining under the adverse conditions of a transition to independence led to a 'holding together' federation without a broadly acceptable political future. As is clear from the evidence from the Spanish case, the circumstances that drive elite consensus are different in "coming" and "holding" together federations, which can affect the future dynamics of the federation. Mohit Bhattacharya notes that the integration of the 568 princely states-some of which were somewhat reluctant to join-had already occurred before
Ambedkar presented a draft of the Constitution to the Constituent Assembly in late 1948. While the break up of the Indian federation is not probable, it is certainly more likely than in the cases of "coming" together federations. 
VII. Conclusion
The circumstances that facilitate a 'holding together' federation can matter a great deal.
Adverse conditions often motivate political elites to cobble together an agreement to avoid a worse alternative (i.e. state dissolution, authoritarianism) that does not settle important points of contention. This inevitably engenders a certain degree of conflict within institutional parameters, which may not threaten stability initially, but will down the line. In cases, such as Spain, where there is no shared vision of a broadly acceptable political future, we can expect that one or more groups will eventually realize that they cannot achieve their goals within institutional parameters, and challenge the structure of the system. It may be, therefore, that 'holding together' origins ensure that a federation will be vulnerable to centrifugal forces, making it advisable to hold off on a federal solution until an agreement can avoid the ambiguity that is necessary when the parties do not envision the same political future.
